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Abstrakt 
Tato práce se zabývá současnými trendy v aplikaci teorie her k tvorbě ekonomických 
modelů, které se následně využívají při ekonomickém rozhodování s podporou 
prostředků informatiky. Práce se zejména opírá o poznatky teorie statických 
a dynamických her a her s dokonalými a nedokonalými informacemi. Zkoumány jsou 
modely týkající se sdílení zdrojů, aukcí a managementu. Pro každý z popsaných modelů 
je prezentována konkrétní aplikace. 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This thesis deals with the present trends in application of game theory to creation of 
economic models, which are subsequently used in economic decision making with the 
support of tools of information technology. It mainly focuses on the tools of static and 
dynamic games and games with perfect and imperfect information. Models of resource 
sharing, auctions and management are under investigation. For each of the described 
models a concrete application is presented. 
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Introduction 
Imagine a classic childhood game of hide-n-seek. One child from the group is selected 
to be “it” and has to count to twenty with eyes closed at the base while the other kids 
hide. After counting, his task is to find the others and tag them. Hidden kids have to get 
to the base without getting tagged. Each one of them has one important decision to 
make – where to hide? Should I hide where I’ve been hidden before, or should I hide 
where the person that was “it” didn‘t look before? Should I hide together with my 
friend? They have to consider other players’ decisions in order to make their own.  
We have played games like these since we were children. What this game has in 
common with the games game theory analyzes is the process of making strategic 
decisions - decisions that are made in order to achieve a certain goal (win the game) 
while taking in consideration other players’ decisions. Game theory analyses these 
situations where multiple strategic decision makers interact together - they “play a 
game”. 
In economic context we can consider bargaining about wage between a potential 
employee and employer as a game. Each player has a certain goal - the employee to get 
the job with the highest wage possible and employer to get the employee to work for 
him for the lowest wage possible. But both of them have to consider the other one when 
making an offer, the employer (if he wants the employee) cannot offer a wage that is too 
low, as the potential employer might get insulted and leave. Same goes for the potential 
employee - he cannot ask for a wage that is too high (if he wants the job). This is a 
game in the game theoretic sense.  
Other example can be when a firm makes a decision whether to enter a new market. 
How will the firms that already are in this market react? Will they try to fight? Will the 
incumbent firm (firm that is already on the market) try to take preliminary measures to 
keep the potential competitors from entering the market? They are also playing a game. 
This work’s aim is to describe the models in game theory that are commonly applied to 
economic decision making. First, basic concepts of game theory and then basic games 
investigated by game theorists are reviewed. The following chapters describe more 
complex models and there is also an example of economic application for each one of 
them. A few applications using information technology are also presented. 
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1 Aim of the work 
This work aims to describe and apply the current game theoretic models and methods 
on real world strategic economic decision problems. The first two chapters explain the 
most basic concepts and tools needed to solve more complicated situations. The 
following chapters describe in detail few of the most important theories together with 
their applications on more complex examples. 
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2 Theoretical basis of the work 
This chapter contains basic concepts of game theory needed for further considerations 
and constructions. 
2.1 Game 
To analyze a game from a game theoretical point of view the game has to be clearly 
defined. We have to define rules, players and their available strategies and payoffs for 
each one of them. Based on the differences in the criteria above we can distinguish a 
number of different types of games. 
2.1.1 Static games 
Static games are the games which are the easiest to analyze. In static games each one of 
the players makes his decision simultaneously with the other players-they do not know 
the actions of other players at the point of making the decision. After making the 
decision the players are assigned payoffs based on the decisions chosen.  
(GIBBONS, 1992, p.1)  
A game of rock-paper-scissors can serve as an example for this type of games. Both 
players simultaneously choose between rock, paper and scissors and both of them 
instantly know who has won.  
2.1.2 Dynamic games 
In dynamic games, players move in a given order. When they are making their move, 
they are aware of actions made by players moving before them (but not necessarily all 
the moves). An example of a dynamic game can be the game of chess. 
(BIERMAN and FERNANDEZ, 1998, p.121) 
2.1.3 Games with incomplete information 
Games in which one or both of the players has incomplete information about the 
payoffs are called games with incomplete information. An economic example can be a 
sale of drilling rights for a parcel. The buyers don’t know if there really is a source of 
oil in this place or more precisely they don’t know exactly how rich this source is.  
13 
 
Another example for this kind of games can be buying a used car. The car salesman 
knows the true value of the car he is selling, but the buyer does not. This is also an 
example of a game with asymmetric information. 
2.1.4 Cooperative games 
In cooperative games the players cooperate together to achieve their individual goals. 
The key in analyzing these games is to find the players’ motivation to cooperate. 
Usually it is not simple to model cooperation - see Prisoner’s dilemma in the next 
chapter. 
2.2 Players 
Players are the strategic decision makers in our games. In the wage-bargaining example 
in the introduction the players were the employee and the employer. Important notion is 
that the players are always considered rational – they always try to take actions which 
lead to the best results for them (they are selfish).  
2.3 Strategies 
A strategy in game theory represents a plan of response to each one of the courses the 
game can take. Strategy is a complete plan of actions for the game for the player. A list 
of strategies, one for each player, is called a strategy profile. 
(BIERMAN and FERNANDEZ, 1998, p.7) 
We can distinguish two kinds of strategies based on the presence of random factor: 
• Pure strategies - they are not random 
• Mixed strategies - they involve a probability for each move 
Strategies will be capitalized - for example Buy, Don’t buy. Strategy profiles will be 
written in curly braces – {Buy, Don’t buy}, where Buy is the strategy for the first player 
and Don’t buy is the strategy for the second player.  
2.4 Payoffs 
Payoff is the outcome that the player gets for each of the strategy profiles. They 
represent what the player gets at the end of the game. In this work the payoffs will be 
usually given in terms of monetary gains/losses. In real world people usually consider 
14 
 
more than just monetary gains. List of payoffs for each strategy profile is called the 
payoff vector. Payoffs for simple non-cooperative games can be represented using a 
matrix, for example the payoff matrix for the rock-paper-scissors game is depicted in 
table 2.1. 
 
Rock Paper Scissors
Rock (0, 0) (-1, 1) (1, -1)
Paper (1, -1) (0, 0) (-1, 1)
Scissors (-1, 1) (1, -1) (0, 0)
Player 2
Player 1
Payoffs: (Player 1, Player 2)  
Table 2.1 Payoffs for the rock-paper-scissors game  
 
Where payoff (0, 0) means that both players don’t get anything – it’s a draw, (1, -1) 
means that the first player has won and gets a payoff of 1 (1€ for example), (-1, 1) 
means that the second player has won and gets a payoff of 1.  
2.4.1 Zero-sum games and non-zero sum games 
A zero-sum game is the game where what one player loses, the other one wins. In other 
words the sum of the payoffs of all players is zero. On the other hand, games where the 
sum of payoffs is a non-zero value are called non-zero sum games. 
2.5 Normal form 
The normal-form representation of a n-player game specifies the players’ strategy 
profiles S1,…,Sn and their payoff vectors u1,…,un. We can denote this game by G = 
{S1,…,Sn;u1,…, un}. 
(GIBBONS, 1992, p.4) 
Normal form representation can be used to describe a static game. It is also called the 
strategic form of the game.  
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3 Problem analysis and current situation 
This chapter describes some of the classic games and explains how to solve them. These 
games and tools used to solve them will serve as a basis to understand and solve more 
complex games in the following chapters. Most important concepts introduced in this 
chapter are – game matrix, Nash equilibrium and Focal point equilibrium (Schelling 
point).  
3.1 Solving a simple game with one player 
In this subchapter, a simplified example game will be used to help explain the necessary 
tools needed to solve the following games. The game goes as follows: 
We have a mid-sized lake in the mountains. In this lake a special kind of pearls of 
superb quality was found. These pearls do not regenerate, and it is assumed that there 
are 4000 of them in the lake. Each one of the pearls is worth 500€.  
The Pearl Hunters company has an exclusive pearl hunting 4-year license for this lake. 
The price of pearls does not change over the course of these 4 years. The company has 
to make a decision whether to buy a special robot which can search for the pearls. 
Without it, using only trained divers, they can expect to find 1000 pearls per year, so 
they will find all of the pearls in 4 years. If they buy the robot, they can expect that they 
will find 4000 pearls per year, which means they will find all of them in one year. This 
special robot costs 750 000€, while the training costs for divers are only 400 000€. The 
cost to extract the pearls is 100€ per pearl. The following table sums the expected costs 
and revenues. 
 
Divers Robot
Searching cost 400 000€ 750 000€
Extracting cost 400 000€ 400 000€
Total cost 800 000€ 1 150 000€
Revenue 2 000 000€ 2 000 000€
Profit 1 200 000€ 850 000€  
Table 3.1 Sum of costs, revenues and profits for the Pearl Hunters company 
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The player in this game is the Pearl Hunters company, its strategy is either to use the 
Divers or to use the Robot and the payoffs are respectively 1 200 000€ and 850 000€.  
In this example we can say without the use of any additional tools that the most 
profitable strategy is to not buy the Robot and use the Divers, getting the payoff of  
1 200 000€.  
3.2 Game with two players 
Now, we will consider one important modification to the previous game. The Pearl 
Hunters company does not have an exclusive license for the pearl hunting for the lake. 
There is another company that wants to invest in pearl hunting in this lake – Pearl 
Seekers. This company is in every aspect the same as the Pearl Hunters. But now there 
is one important difference in profits, which are split between the two companies. Both 
of the companies share the resources - pearls in the lake. In this game we assume that 
money in the future has the same value for the company as money today.   
Now we have two players – Pearl Hunters and Pearl Seekers, both of them have two 
available strategies –Divers and Robot. So now we have four available strategy profiles:  
• {Divers, Divers} – both companies use the Divers strategy 
• {Divers, Robot} – Pearl Hunters company uses the Divers strategy, and 
the Pearl Seekers company uses the Robot strategy 
• {Robot, Divers} – Pearl Hunters company uses the Robot strategy , and 
the Pearl Seekers company uses the Divers strategy 
• {Robot, Robot} – both companies use the Robot strategy 
Each one of the strategy profiles leads to a unique payoff. The payoffs for each strategy 
profile can be found in the following table. 
 
Divers Robot
Divers (400 000€, 400 000€) (-30 000€, 480 000€)
Robot (480 000€, -30 000€) (50 000€, 50 000€)
Pearl Seekers
Pearl Hunters
Payoffs: (Pearl Hunters, Pearl Seekers)
 
Table 3.2 Payoff matrix for the Pearl Hunters and Pearl Seekers companies  
17 
 
 
The players in this game make their decisions simultaneously without knowing the 
decision of the other player - it is a static game. Now we will try to find the best 
decision that each player can make.  
First we will analyze the situation from the Pearl Hunters’ point of view. They do not 
know the decision the Pearl Seekers make, but they have to take it into account. If Pearl 
Hunters believe that Pearl Seekers will play the Robot strategy than it is reasonable to 
also play the Robot strategy, because it yields the payoff of 50 000€, compared to a 
payoff of -30 000€ if they would play the Divers strategy.  On the other hand if Pearl 
Hunters believe that Pearl Seekers will play the Divers strategy, than the best they can 
do is to play the Robot strategy again and get a payoff of 480 000€, compared to payoff 
of 400 000€. So we can say that playing the Robot strategy strictly dominates playing 
the Divers strategy, or that the Divers strategy is strictly dominated by the Robot 
strategy. It means that it is never rational to play the Divers strategy in this game. 
Formally: 
“The strategy S1 strictly dominates the strategy S2 for a player if, given any collection 
of strategies, that could be played by the other players, playing S1 results in a strictly 
higher payoff for that player than does playing S2. The strategy S2 is also said to be 
strictly dominated by S1. A rational player will never adopt a strictly dominated 
strategy nor expect a rational opponent to adopt one.”  
(BIERMAN and FERNANDEZ, 1998, p.9) 
At this point we can start looking for strictly dominated strategies in our game and 
eliminate them. We can eliminate the Divers strategy, as this one will never be played. 
This leaves us with only one strategy left - Robot. This strategy is strictly dominant.  
“A strictly dominant strategy for a player is one that strictly dominates every other 
strategy of that player. A rational player will adopt a strictly dominant strategy 
whenever it exists”. 
(BIERMAN and FERNANDEZ, 1998, p.10) 
Because our players’ payoffs are symmetrical, we now know that Pearl Seekers will 
also play the Robot strategy. We have only one strategy left for each player. The game 
is solved. The solution is a strictly dominant strategy equilibrium. 
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“The strategy profile (S1,…,Sn) is a strictly dominant strategy equilibrium if for 
every player i, Si is a strictly dominant strategy”. 
(BIERMAN and FERNANDEZ, 1998, p.10) 
But this equilibrium solution has one problem. The players are much worse off playing 
these equilibrium strategies than if they both play the Divers strategy. If both players 
can cooperate and play the Divers strategy they can both have payoffs of 400 000€ - 
350 000€ more than when both playing the Robot strategy. The equilibrium outcome is 
Pareto dominated. 
“The outcome O of a game is Pareto dominated if there is some other outcome O’ such 
that: 
(1) every player either strictly prefers O’ to O or is indifferent between O’ and O, 
and  
(2) some player strictly prefers O’ to O.  
An outcome is Pareto optimal if it is not Pareto dominated by any other outcome of the 
game”. 
(BIERMAN and FERNANDEZ, 1998, p.12) 
To give a more complete list of basic definitions we will also define weak dominance: 
“The strategy S1 weakly dominates the strategy S2 for a player if, given any collection 
of strategies that could be played by the other players, playing S1 never results in a 
lower payoff to that player than does playing S2 and, in at least one instance, S1 gives 
the player a strictly higher payoff than does S2. The strategy S2 is said to be weakly 
dominated by S1. A rational player will seldom play a weakly dominated strategy. 
A weakly dominant strategy for a player is one that weakly dominates every other 
strategy of that player. A rational player will usually play a weakly dominant strategy. 
The strategy profile (S1, S2,…, Sn) is a weakly dominant strategy equilibrium if for 
every player i, Si is a weakly dominant strategy”. 
(BIERMAN and FERNANDEZ, 1998, p.12) 
 
If we slightly modify the previous game and add the option to use neither Divers nor the 
Robot we will get a different payoff scheme: 
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Divers Robot Nothing
Divers (400 000€, 400 000€) (-30 000€, 480 000€) (1 200 000€, 0€)
Robot (480 000€, -30 000€) (50 000€, 50 000€) (850 000€, 0€)
Nothing (0€, 1 200 000€) (0€, 850 000€) (0€, 0€)
Pearl Hunters
Pearl Seekers
Payoffs: (Pearl Hunters, Pearl Seekers)
 
Table 3.3 Payoffs for the pearl-hunting game with 3 strategies 
In this modified game dominant strategy (weak or strong) no longer exists. Robot 
dominates Nothing, but it no longer dominates Divers. Divers and Nothing do not 
dominate any other strategy. But from the payoffs it’s easy to see that the Nothing 
strategy will never be used, as the players can guarantee themselves at least the outcome 
of using Robot, which is at least 50 000€, which is better than 0€. The Nothing strategy 
is strictly dominated so we can eliminate it. When we eliminate the Nothing strategy we 
are left with the same result as before – to play the Robot strategy. This strategy is 
called iterated strictly dominant. 
“A strategy is iterated strictly dominant for player i if and only if it is the only strategy 
in -Si, where -Si is the intersection of the following sequence of nested sets of strategies: 
(1) Si1 consists of all of player i’s strategies that are not strictly dominated 
(2) For n > 1, Sin consists of the strategies in Sin-1 that are not strictly dominated 
when we restrict the other players j ≠ i to the strategies in Sjn-1. 
The strategy profile (S1,S2, …,Sn)  is an iterated strictly dominant strategy 
equilibrium if for every player i, Si is an iterated strictly dominant strategy”. 
(BIERMAN and FERNANDEZ, 1998, p.14) 
Iterated weakly dominance is a bit more complicated and will not be used in this 
work.  
In our example we needed just one iteration to remove the Nothing strategy. In more 
complex games, there can be much more iterations.  
In most of the games there will be more than one iterated strategy equilibrium. Example 
for such a game can be a modified pearl hunting game. The payoff scheme of this 
modified game is shown in table 3.4. 
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Divers Robot Nothing
Divers (400 000€, 400 000€) (60 000€, 480 000€) (1 200 000€, 0€)
Robot (480 000€, 60 000€) (50 000€, 50 000€) (850 000€, 0€)
Nothing (0€, 1 200 000€) (0€, 850 000€) (0€, 0€)
Pearl Seekers
Pearl Hunters
Payoffs: (Pearl Hunters, Pearl Seekers)
 
Table 3.4 Payoffs for the modified pearl-hunting game with 3 strategies  
 
The difference is that when one of the companies uses the Divers strategy and the other 
one uses the Robot, they now don’t get a loss of 30 000€, but instead they make a profit 
of 60 000€.  
Again, the Nothing strategy is strictly dominated for both Pearl Hunters and Pearl 
Seekers, as both firms can make more than 0€ in all cases using either the Divers or 
Robot strategy. So the Nothing strategy can be eliminated. The following table shows 
the payoff scheme after the elimination of dominated strategy. 
Divers Robot
Divers (400 000€, 400 000€) (60 000€, 480 000€)
Robot (480 000€, 60 000€) (50 000€, 50 000€)
Pearl Seekers
Pearl Hunters
Payoffs: (Pearl Hunters, Pearl Seekers)
 
Table 3.5 Payoffs for the modified pearl-hunting game with 3 strategies without 
the dominated strategies  
 
Now there are no dominated strategies to eliminate. Both of the players are assumed to 
be rational, so they will always play the strategy which has the best outcome for them. 
If Pearl Hunters believe that Pearl Seekers will use Robot, then they have two options: 
• Use Robot too and earn 50 000€ 
• Use Divers and earn 60 000€ 
The rational choice for Pearl Hunters is to use Divers (play the Divers strategy) and earn 
60 000€. The Divers strategy is the best response to the Robot strategy being played by 
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Pearl Seekers. Now if Pearl Seekers believe that Pearl Hunters will use Divers they have 
two options too: 
• Use Divers too and earn 400 000€ 
• Use Robot and earn 480 000€ 
The rational choice for Pearl Seekers now is to use Robot and earn 480 000€, which is a 
best response to the Divers strategy being played by the Pearl Hunters. The result is that 
players will adopt the strategy profile {Robot, Divers}. This belief is self-confirming, 
meaning that it is the rational choice for both players and neither one of them can do 
any better by unilaterally changing their choice. Because the payoff scheme is 
symmetrical, the same is true for the strategy profile {Divers, Robot}. This is the 
concept of the Nash equilibrium named after Professor John C. Nash. The formal 
definition is: 
“Suppose there are N players in a game, Xi is the set of possible strategies for player i, 
and vi(s1, …, sN) is player i’s payoff when the players choose the strategy profile {si, …, 
sN}. A Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile {si*, sN*} such that each strategy si* is an 
element of Xi, and maximizes the function fi(x) = vi(si*, …, si-1*, x, si+1*, …, sN*) among 
the elements of Xi. That is, at a Nash equilibrium, each player’s equilibrium strategy is a 
best response to the belief that the other players will adopt their Nash equilibrium 
strategies”. 
(BIERMAN and FERNANDEZ, 1998, p.16) 
3.3 Important simple game examples 
3.3.1 Prisoner’s dilemma 
Prisoner’s dilemma is a classic game whose result is not Pareto optimal.  
The story goes: 
“Two suspects are arrested and charged with a crime. The police lack sufficient 
evidence to convict the suspects, unless at least one confesses. The police hold the 
suspects in separate cells and explain the consequences that will follow from the actions 
they could take. If neither confesses then both will be convicted of a minor offense and 
sentenced to a one month in jail. If both confess then both will be sentenced to jail for 
six months. Finally, if one confesses but the other does not, then the confessor will be 
22 
 
released immediately but the other will be sentenced to nine months in jail – six for the 
crime and further three for obstructing justice”. 
(GIBBONS, 1992, p.2-3) 
 
Cooperates Defects
Cooperates (-1, -1) (-9, 0)
Defects (-9, 0) (-6, -6)
Payoffs: (Prisoner 1, Prisoner 2)
Prisoner 1
Prisoner 2
 
Table 3.6 Payoffs for the prisoner’s dilemma 
 
Another example for Prisoner’s dilemma can be a Marketing war: 
We have two companies and both of them have two strategies: either invest in an 
expensive advertising campaign or not. If both of them invest in this campaign, they 
both don’t get any competitive advantage over the other and end up only losing the 
money for the campaign. If only one of the companies pays for the expensive campaign, 
they get a larger market share and are more profitable and the second one gets a smaller 
share. If both of them don’t invest in the campaign, they don’t gain any additional 
market share, but they also don’t lose money for the campaign. 
Payoff matrix for the advertising game is in table 3.7. 
 
Invest Don't invest
Invest (0, 0) (10, 0)
Don't invest (0, 10) (3, 3)
Company 2
Company 1
Payoffs: (Company 1, Company 2)  
Table 3.7 Payoffs for the advertising war game 
 
The pearl hunting example game was also of this type.  
To solve this game, we can search for a Nash equilibrium: 
If Prisoner 1 believes that Prisoner 2 will cooperate he has two options: 
• Defect and don’t spend any time in prison 
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• Cooperate and spend a month in prison 
The rational choice is to defect and not go to jail. Now if Prisoner 2 believes that 
Prisoner 1 will defect, he has two options: 
• Defect and get 6 months in prison 
• Cooperate and get 9 months in prison 
His best response is to defect, so strategy profile {Defect, Cooperate} is not a Nash 
equilibrium and neither is {Cooperate, Cooperate}. 
Now suppose that Prisoner 1 believes that Prisoner 2 will defect. He has two options: 
• Defect and get 6 months in prison 
• Cooperate and get 9 months in prison 
Rationally he will choose to defect and because the payoffs in the game are 
symmetrical, Player 2 will defect too. In conclusion, there is only one Nash equilibrium 
in this game, the strategy profile {Defect, Defect} – both players will defect and spend 6 
months in jail (both will invest in the ad campaign and make zero profit). This outcome 
is Pareto dominated by the {Cooperate, Cooperate} strategy profile’s outcome, which is 
one of the reasons why is Prisoner’s dilemma one of the most known and studied game 
of game theory. 
3.3.2 Coordination game/stag hunt 
The coordination game goes like this: 
You want to go on a date with your girlfriend to a classy restaurant. Your girlfriend 
prefers going to this restaurant dressed in formal clothing. You feel the same way. Most 
important is that both of you go to the restaurant dressed the same way.   
The payoffs are represented in the following table. 
Formal Casual
Formal (2, 2) (0, 0)
Casual (0, 0) (1, 1)
Your girlfriend
You
Payoffs: (You, Your girlfriend)
 
Table 3.8 Payoffs for the coordination game 
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This game is usually called the coordination game, as both players have to coordinate 
their moves to get the best result. In this instance it is going to the restaurant formally 
dressed.  
Another variant of this game is called the stag hunt: 
Two hunters go on a hunt. They both have two options: 
• Hunt a stag 
• Hunt a hare 
They both make their decisions simultaneously and independently of each other. If they 
want to hunt the stag, they need to cooperate. They can hunt a hare alone, but the hare is 
worth less than a stag. The payoff scheme is the same as in the previous example. 
There are two Nash equilibria: 
• Both dress formally/Both go stag hunting 
• Both dress casually/Both go hare hunting 
But for the players to choose the Pareto optimal one – Formal/Stag we have to make a 
few assumptions about the game. We have to assume that: 
• Both players know the payoff scheme – it is common knowledge 
• Both players are rational – they try to maximize their payoffs given their 
knowledge about the game 
• Both players prefer formal to casual/stag to hare 
3.3.3 Battle of the sexes 
This game is similar to the coordination game, but there is a slight modification. This 
time you want to go on a date with your girlfriend to a medium-class restaurant. Your 
girlfriend prefers going to this restaurant dressed in formal clothing. But you prefer 
going there dressed casually. But again, both of you prefer going to the restaurant 
dressed the same way to dressing differently.  
The payoffs are represented in the following table. 
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Formal Casual
Formal (1, 2) (0, 0)
Casual (0, 0) (2, 1)
Your girlfriend
You
Payoffs: (You, Your girlfriend)
 
Table 3.9 Payoffs for the Battle of the sexes game  
This game is usually called the Battle of the sexes. There are two Nash equilibria in this 
game: {Formal, Casual} and {Casual, Formal}. Without using threats/promises or 
changing the game there is no single solution to this game (no way to select one of the 
Nash equilibria), because any kind of reasoning that leads you to choose Casual 
clothing will lead your girlfriend to choose Formal, leading to the payoff scheme (0, 0). 
Another way of solving the problem is to use the concept of focal point (or Schelling 
point), introduced by Thomas Schelling. A focal point is a Nash equilibrium (in games 
that have them) that somehow stands out as the best solution. As Schelling states it: 
“Most situations -- perhaps every situation for people who are practiced at this kind of 
game -- provide some clue for coordinating behavior, some focal point for each 
person’s expectation of what the other expects him to expect to be expected to do. 
Finding the key, or rather finding a key -- any key that is mutually recognized as the 
key becomes the key -- may depend on imagination more than on logic; it may depend 
on analogy, precedent, accidental arrangement, symmetry, aesthetic or geometric 
configuration, casuistic reasoning, and who the parties are and what they know about 
each other”. 
(SCHELLING, 1970, p.57) 
An example of a focal point can be: 
You have been to a few dates with your girlfriend and she always dresses formally. So it 
is safe to assume that she will do it this time again and you should do the same. So the 
strategy profile {Formal, Formal} is a Schelling point in this example. 
3.3.4 Chicken 
The game goes like this: 
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There are two drivers going against each other on a narrow road – you and your 
opponent. The one that swerves is called the chicken. There are four possible outcomes 
for this game: 
• The opponent swerves, he is the chicken, you are the winner 
• You swerve, you are the chicken, he is the winner 
• Both of you swerve, both of you are chickens 
• None of you swerve, cars crash, both of you are dead 
The payoffs can be represented with the following table: 
Don't swerve Swerve
Don't swerve (-5, -5) (2, -1)
Swerve (-1, 2) (0, 0)
The opponent
You
Payoffs: (You, Your opponent)
 
Table 3.10 Payoffs for the game of Chicken  
 
There can be many variants for this game, for example: 
A company has got into problems. The unionized workers are demanding salary raises, 
threatening they will go on a strike. If the management gives in to their demands, it 
loses its power (and money). If the workers give up, the union loses its power (and also 
money). If they both give in, nobody gains anything. But if both sides refuse to give in, 
there will be a strike, which is the worst outcome for both sides (same as crash in the 
previous example). 
The Nash equilibria in this example are the ones where one of the players swerves/gives 
in and the other one does not. The profile {Swerve, Swerve} is not a Nash equilibrium, 
because if any of the players knew that the other one is going to swerve, he will choose 
not to swerve and “win” the game. But there is no simple way to decide which Nash 
equilibrium will actually be played. One way to solve these games is again the Schelling 
point (if the management has given in a few times before, it is reasonable they will do it 
again).  
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3.3.5 Ultimatum game 
This game has been practically studied by many game theorists, economists and 
psychologists. It is usually stated like this: 
Player A is given a sum of money. He has to offer Player B a portion of this money. If 
Player B accepts his proposal, they split the money according to the proposal. But if 
Player B rejects the offer, both of them get nothing. Therefore Player A makes an 
ultimatum. 
The classic game theoretic solution is that Player B should and will accept any offer, as 
any monetary gain is preferred to none. So Player A should make the minimal offer 
possible and this offer will be accepted. This game has been modified and practically 
played in many ways, but most of the time, the game theoretic solution was in reality 
not used, as minimal offers were rejected by Player B. There are various explanations 
for that using the knowledge of psychology, sociology or the concepts of evolutionary 
game theory.  
(BEARDEN, 2001) 
3.3.6 Dictator game 
The dictator game is a variation of the ultimatum game. The game goes as follows: 
Player A is given a sum of money and he has to propose a split with player B. Player B 
is then given his portion and player A keeps the rest. 
This is not exactly an example of a game, but it is a case of strategic decision of one 
player (it is a degenerate game). The game theoretic solution in this case is to offer 
Player B nothing and keep all the money. But in the experiments, again this solution 
was not used. Majority of the results showed that Player A proposed a non-zero sum of 
money to Player B, displaying altruism. It proves that players in real life consider not 
only monetary gains. 
(BEARDEN, 2001) 
3.4 Dynamic games 
In dynamic games the players do not make their decisions at the same time, but they do 
it in a given sequence. The order of moves affects the solutions for these games, 
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because the players moving later in the game observe the moves made before and make 
their decisions considering that.  
3.4.1 Extensive form 
To completely describe a dynamic game, we can use its extensive form. The extensive 
form consists of: 
1. Set of players – a list of players playing the game. One special player is Nature – 
it represents exogenous actions. Nature does not play a role in every game. 
Nature’s moves are usually associated with external events that happen with 
some probability.  
2. Order of events – this order is usually described by the game tree. It describes 
the possibilities each player has at certain points in the game. The game tree has 
to have a unique initial node, the root, from which the game begins. A finite 
path of predecessors from each node of the tree to the root has to exist.  Each 
node is immediately preceded by only one node (except from the root). Each 
path of the game has to reach a terminal node. The path to the terminal node 
represents the individual decisions that had to be made to get to that terminal 
node – the game history. 
3. Order of moves – each node has a player assigned to them. Nature, if present, 
moves first and determines the outcome.  
4. Available actions – at each node the player whose order it is to play has a set of 
available actions. The number of actions is equal to the number of nodes that 
immediately success the current node. Each successor is associated with one 
unique action. 
5. Information sets – Information sets are used to model games of imperfect 
information. When certain nodes are grouped into information sets, the player 
cannot distinguish at which node he really is – he does not know what the 
preceding decisions were. The available actions have to be the same for all of 
the nodes in one information set (otherwise the player can actually distinguish 
the nodes).  
6. Payoffs – each terminal node is associated with a certain payoff for each player. 
Nature does not have payoffs.  
(VEGA-REDONDO, 2003) 
29 
 
I will explain the necessary tools needed to solve dynamic games on the following 
example: 
Two influential political parties are arguing about two new laws that are going to be 
voted in the parliament. The law that is going to be voted for the first is the new 
Commercial code, which is going to change the way the minimum wage is calculated – 
effectively it is going to get higher. The Labour party is a supporter of this law. The 
second law legalizes same-sex marriage. The Liberal party is a supporter of this law. 
Liberal party does not really care about the Commercial code law, and the Labour party 
does not care about the same-sex marriages law. But it is of value if they vote the same 
(to show the public that they stand together). Neither of the parties alone has the power 
to push the law they want, but together they have enough members to push the vote. It is 
known that the Labour party is going to vote for the Commercial code and the Liberal 
party for the same-sex marriages. The Labour party will know if the Liberal party voted 
for or against the Commercial code before the same-sex marriages law is going to be 
voted. Both parties know before what is the stance of the other party on these laws – it 
is a game of perfect information.  
3.4.2 Game tree 
The resulting sequential game can be illustrated using a special kind of graph - a game 
tree: 
 
Figure 3.1 Game tree for the politics game 
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The nodes in the tree represent the points where the parties have to make their 
decisions. Both players know the previous decisions. The outcomes of the game can be 
also represented using a table: 
• CC+/CC- means for/against the Commercial code 
• SSM+/SSM- means for/against the same-sex marriages 
 
CC+ CC-
SSM+ (5, 5) (4, -1)
SSM- (0, 4) (1, 1)
Liberal
Labour
Payoffs: (Liberal, Labour)  
Table 3.11 Payoffs for the politics game  
First we can find the Nash equilibria in this game using the strategic form of this game. 
The strategic form shows the payoffs for each strategy profile: 
 
CC+ CC-
(SSM+, SSM+) (5, 5) (4, -1)
(SSM+, SSM-) (5, 5) (1, 1)
(SSM-, SSM+) (0, 4) (4, -1)
(SSM-, SSM-) (0, 4) (1, 1)
Liberal
Labour
Payoffs: (Liberal, Labour)  
Table 3.12 Strategic form of the politics game 
 
From the strategic form of the game we can try to find the Nash equilibria by evaluating 
each strategy profile.  
• If the Labour party plays (SSM+, SSM+) strategy, then Liberal party will choose 
to play CC+. If the Liberal plays CC+, then the Labor party cannot do better 
than play (SSM+, SSM+), so {CC+, (SSM+, SSM+)} is a Nash equilibrium. 
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• If the Labour party plays (SSM+, SSM-), then Liberals are better of playing 
CC+. If the Liberal party plays CC+, then the Labor party cannot do better than 
play (SSM+, SSM-) , so {CC+, (SSM+, SSM-)} is a Nash equilibrium. 
• If the Labour party plays (SSM-, SSM+), then Liberals are better off playing 
CC-. If the Liberal party plays CC-, then playing (SSM+, SSM+) is better than 
playing (SSM-, SSM+), so it is not a Nash equilibrium. 
• If the Labour party plays (SSM-, SSM-), then Liberals are better of playing CC-. 
If the Liberal party plays CC-, then Labour party cannot do better than play 
(SSM-, SSM-), so {CC-, (SSM-, SSM-)} is a Nash equilibrium. 
3.4.3 Backwards induction 
We have found 3 Nash equilibria for this game. To find out which one is the most likely 
to occur we can use backwards induction (without the player Nature). 
“This procedure has six steps: 
1. Start at the terminal nodes of the game and trace each one to its immediate 
predecessor, which will be a decision node for some player. These decision 
nodes are either “trivial”, “basic”, or “complex”. A decision node is basic if 
each of its branches leads to exactly one terminal node. A basic node with only 
one branch is trivial. A decision node is complex if it is not basic. If you reach a 
trivial decision node, then keep moving up the tree until you reach either a 
complex or nontrivial basic decision node or until you can go no further. 
2. Find the optimal move at each basic decision node reached in step 1 by 
comparing the payoffs the player obtains at each terminal node reached from 
this decision node. Notice that every path between a basic decision node A and a 
terminal node B starts at a unique branch of A. The branch that leads to the 
highest payoff for the player is the optimal move to make at that node. 
3. Erase all the non-optimal branches that originate from each of the basic decision 
nodes you examined in step 2. Each of these basic decision nodes becomes 
trivial.  
4. You now have a new game tree that is simpler than the original one. If in step 1 
you arrived at the root of the tree, you are now done. 
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5. If you have not yet reached the root, then go back to step 1 and start all over 
again. In this way, you work your way step by step toward the root.  
6. For each player, collect together the optimal decisions at each of the player’s 
decision nodes. This collection of decisions constitutes that player’s optimal 
strategy in the game.” 
(BIERMAN and FERNANDEZ, 1998, p.129-130) 
 
Now we can apply this rule to the previous example.  
First we find the optimal decision of the Labour party at the bottom decision node. If 
they support SSM, they get a payoff of -1, if they do not support, they get a payoff of 
+1, so the optimal decision is to not support SSM. In the upper node the optimal 
solution is to support SSM and get a payoff of 5 compared to 4 when voting against 
SSM. After eliminating the non-optimal branches the game tree looks as depicted in 
figure 3.3. 
 
Figure 3.2 Game tree after elimination of non-optimal branches 
 
The only thing left is to find the optimal decision for the Liberal party at the remaining 
node. The optimal decision is to support the CC and get a payoff of 5 compared to not 
supporting and payoff of 1. So the only Nash equilibrium strategy profile left after the 
backwards induction is applied is {CC+, (SSM+, SSM-)}.  
3.4.4 Threats, promises and credibility 
It is possible that the Labour party will try to force the Liberal party into voting for the 
CC by making a threat: „We will not vote for SSM if you do not vote for the CC“. 
From the previous solution we can see that if the Liberal party votes for against the CC, 
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it is in Labour party’s best interest to vote against SSM. It means that the threat made by 
the Labour party is credible and the Labour party should not ignore it. They can also 
make a promise: „We will vote for SSM if you vote for the CC“. Again it is in their 
best interest to keep their promise, so this promise is credible. Nash equilibria can also 
contain incredible threats - threats, which are not rational for the issuer to realize. 
 
I will illustrate the idea of an incredible threat on the following example: 
Three top managers (we will call them 1, 2, 3) in a company are voting whether to cut 
their working hours by one hour. The company policy is that the employees of the 
company are informed not only about the result of the voting, but also about who voted 
for and who voted against the proposition. The manager that votes for the proposition is 
going to anger his subordinates and they will in response stall him at work for half an 
hour. The managers vote one after another and the vote is public. The game tree for this 
game looks is shown in the following figure. 
 
Figure 3.3 Game tree for the managers game 
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Using backwards induction we can find that the equilibrium solution will be the strategy 
profile {-, +, +}. Say for example that manager 3 would threaten manager 1 with saying: 
“If you do not vote for the proposition, I will not vote for it either.” We can see that this 
threat is not credible because it is in his best interest to vote for the proposition to get a 
payoff of 0.5 compared to payoff of 0 if he would have kept his word. 
3.4.5 Subgame perfect equilibrium 
To find Nash equilibria that do not involve incredible threats we can use the concept of 
subgame perfect equilibrium. Definition of a subgame follows: 
“The subgame GS of the game GT is a game constructed as follows: 
1. GS has the same players as GT although some of these players may not make any 
moves in GS 
2. The initial node of GS is a subroot of GT and the game tree of GS consists 
of this subroot, all its successor nodes, and the branches between them.  
3. Each player’s payoffs at the terminal nodes of GS are identical to the 
payoffs in GT at the same terminal nodes.” 
(BIERMAN and FERNANDEZ, 1998, p.133-134) 
Every game is a trivial subgame of itself. A proper subgame is a nontrivial subgame of 
a game. 
Subgame perfect equilibrium: 
The strategy profile selected by the backward induction is the subgame perfect 
equilibrium of a dynamic game with perfect information. This is also the equilibrium 
for all proper subgames of G. 
(BIERMAN and FERNANDEZ, 1998, p.133-134) 
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4  Proposals of solutions and their contributions  
4.1 Oligopoly models 
In this chapter four examples of the oligopoly models (games) will be presented: 
• The Cournot game 
• The Stackelberg game 
• The Bertrand game 
• The Contestable monopoly model 
Some of these models were created before the studies of game theory. In the following 
subchapter we will show how they are used together with game theory to solve 
simplified real world examples. 
4.1.1 Cournot model 
Introduced in 1838 by French philosopher, economist and mathematician Antoine 
Augustin Cournot this model (or game) can be used to describe various industry 
structures. In this model all of the competing companies on the market compete by 
choosing their output and try to maximize their profits. All of them decide on the output 
independently at the same time and all of them sell for the same market price. The 
market price of the goods in the Cournot model is a function of the total amount of 
goods, denoted by QT, produced by all of the companies together and it equals the 
market clearing price P: 
𝑃 = 𝑃(𝑄𝑇) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑑𝑃(𝑄𝑇)𝑑𝑄𝑇 < 0 
, where 
𝑄𝑇 =  �𝑄𝑖𝑛
𝑖=1
 
and Qi is the individual output of firm i.   
The model requires the following assumptions: 
• Price is not a strategic variable 
• Products of the companies are identical 
• Products appear at the market simultaneously 
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• Firms do not cooperate 
• The number of firms is fixed 
• The market price decreases when the total output rises 
(FUDENBERG and TIROLE, 1998) 
 
The following example illustrates the use of this model. 
Two firms form a duopoly on the gold mining market: We Mine and Shiny Gold. Both 
of them sell the gold that they mine each month at a gold market. The quantity of gold 
mined by We Mine will be denoted QWM and Shiny Gold’s quantity QSG. The market 
price at the gold market is given by the following demand equation in €/ounce of 24-
karat gold: 
𝑃 =  �840 −  4 ∗ 𝑄𝑇            𝑖𝑓 0 ≤  𝑄𝑇 ≤ 2100                            𝑖𝑓 𝑄𝑇 > 210  
 
Figure 4.1 Demand curve for the gold market 
 
Each month both firms have to decide how much gold they want to mine – they have to 
select a strategy. They decide at the same time and independently. The quantities are 
given in thousands of ounces and revenue, cost and profit in thousands of euro. 
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The mining and transporting costs of the companies are identical and are 600€/ounce. 
Total costs for each company are: 
𝑇𝐶𝑖 = 600 ∗ 𝑄𝑖       𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖 = 𝑊𝑒 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑒, 𝑆ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑦 𝐺𝑜𝑙𝑑 
Now, we can write the profit function for each of the gold mining companies. 
Profit function for the We Mine company: 
𝜋𝑖(𝑄𝑊𝑀) = �840 − 4 ∗ (𝑄𝑊𝑀 + 𝑄𝑆𝐺)� ∗ 𝑄𝑊𝑀 − 𝑄𝑊𝑀 ∗ 600 
Profit function for the Shiny Gold company: 
𝜋𝑖(𝑄𝑆𝐺) = �840 − 4 ∗ (𝑄𝑊𝑀 + 𝑄𝑆𝐺)� ∗ 𝑄𝑆𝐺 − 𝑄𝑆𝐺 ∗ 600 
The profits are considered the payoffs in this game. The companies play a static game 
with complete information (the profit functions are common knowledge). 
 
4.1.1.1 Monopoly 
To compare solutions to this game we will first assume that there is only one company - 
We Mine. In this case its profit function will look like this: 
𝜋𝑊𝑀(𝑄𝑊𝑀) = (840 − 4 ∗ 𝑄𝑊𝑀) ∗ 𝑄𝑊𝑀 − 𝑄𝑊𝑀 ∗ 600 
After simplification: 
𝜋𝑊𝑀(𝑄𝑊𝑀) = 240 ∗ 𝑄𝑊𝑀 − 6 ∗ 𝑄𝑊𝑀2  
To find the optimal output, we now only have to find the maximum of the profit 
function using simple calculus. To find the maximum we have to put the derivative of 
the profit function equal to 0: 240 − 12 ∗ 𝑄𝑊𝑀 = 0 
And the output associated with the maximum profit is: 
𝑄𝑊𝑀 = 20 
Profit at this output level is equal to: 
𝜋𝑊𝑀(20) = 240 ∗ 20 − 6 ∗ 202 = 2400 
So in the case of one company on the market, this company would produce 20 000 
ounces of gold each month and make a profit of 2 400 000€. 
 
 
38 
 
 
Figure 4.2 Graph of the profit function for firm We Mine 
 
4.1.1.2 Duopoly 
We can return to the problem with two competing companies. To illustrate the problem 
in a better fashion, we can use the isoprofit curves. Isoprofit curves show all of the 
different levels of outputs of both mining companies where one of them makes a certain 
level of profit. For a given profit of πx for the company We Mine, the isoprofit curve for 
the Shiny Gold company is the following function: 
𝑄𝑆𝐺 = 60 − 𝜋𝑥4 ∗ 𝑄𝑊𝑀 − 𝑄𝑊𝑀 
The following graph illustrates the isoprofit curves for the company We Mine for these 
levels of profit 0, 250, 500, 1000 and 2000.  
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Figure 4.3 Isoprofit curves for We Mine  
 
Now we have to find the best responses for the level of output selected by the 
competitor. For example if Shiny Gold selects the output of 0 units, then the best 
response for the We Mine company will be to select the output of 20 as if it was alone 
on the market (actually they select their output at the same time, so the best response 
output will be selected next month). For each non-zero output level we have to find an 
isoprofit curve that is tangent to the horizontal line of the output at the height of QSG. 
For example if the Shiny Gold’s output is 30, then the best response for the We Mine 
will be to select the output of 15. It is illustrated in Figure 4.4. 
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Figure 4.4 Best response for the Shiny Gold’s output of 30 
 
To find the best response for each one of the levels of output we have to find the best 
response functions for both companies, that is, the functions that assign a level of 
output to each level of competitor’s output in a way to maximize profit. We can 
calculate this function for the We Mine by taking the partial derivative of their profit 
function with respect to QWM and calculating the level of output when it equals 0.  
𝜕𝜋𝑊𝑀(𝑄𝑊𝑀,𝑄𝑆𝐺)
𝜕𝑄𝑊𝑀
= 240 − 8 ∗ 𝑄𝑊𝑀 − 4 ∗ 𝑄𝑆𝐺 = 0 
Solving for QWM, the best response function for We Mine is: (4.1)                                     𝑄𝑊𝑀𝐵𝑅 (𝑄𝑊𝑀,𝑄𝑆𝐺) = 30 − 0.5 ∗ 𝑄𝑆𝐺 
 Shiny Gold’s best response function: 
(4.2)         𝑄𝑆𝐺𝐵𝑅(𝑄𝑊𝑀,𝑄𝑆𝐺) = 30 − 0.5 ∗ 𝑄𝑊𝑀 
 
To find the quantities that the companies will choose according to Cournot model, we 
now just have to find the intersection of these two best response functions. We can 
depict it graphically as shown in Figure 4.5. 
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Figure 4.5 Intersection of the best response functions 
 
We can also find the equilibrium mathematically by solving a system of linear equations 
4.1 and 4.2. The solution is that both the firms will mine 20 units (20 000ounces), sell 
them for a price of 680€/ounce and earn a profit of 1600 (1 600 000€). This is the 
Cournot duopoly equilibrium for this game. This is also the Nash equilibrium of this 
game as both players maximize their profits when they are playing their best responses 
and they are both playing their best responses in this point. We can also receive the 
same result by iteratively eliminating dominated strategies.  
 
But Cournot model can be used to model more than monopoly and duopoly market a 
structure. By increasing the number of companies and decreasing their market share we 
are also able to model perfect competition.  
4.1.1.3 Perfect competition 
We can modify the previous gold mining example by adding more firms to the market. 
Now for N gold mining companies the profit function for the i-th company will be given 
by. 
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(4.3)  𝜋𝑖(𝑄1, … ,𝑄𝑁) = �(840 − 4 ∗ 𝑄𝑇) ∗ 𝑄𝑖 − 600 ∗ 𝑄𝑖   if 𝑄𝑇 < 210−600 ∗ 𝑄𝑖                                           if 𝑄𝑇 ≥ 210     
When  
𝑄𝑇 = 𝑄𝑖 + 𝑄−𝑖 
we can rewrite 4.3 like this: 
(4.4)  𝜋𝑖(𝑄1, … ,𝑄𝑁) = �(240 − 4 ∗ (𝑄𝑖 + 𝑄−𝑖 )) ∗ 𝑄𝑖    if 𝑄𝑖 < 60 − 𝑄𝑇−600 ∗ 𝑄𝑖                                      if 𝑄𝑖 ≥ 60 − 𝑄𝑇 
From 4.4 we can see that the profit is negative when the number output of companies 
reaches 60. From that we know that if the output of the industry is ≥60 it does not make 
sense to mine and lose money (the costs are not 0).  
So the best response function for the i-th company will be not to mine if the industry 
output is ≥60. To find the best response when the output is <60 we have to take a partial 
derivative of the profit function with respect to Qi and put it equal to 0 to find the 
maximum. 
𝜕𝜋𝑊𝑀(𝑄𝑖,𝑄−𝑖)
𝜕𝑄𝑖
= 240 − 8 ∗ 𝑄𝑖 − 4 ∗ 𝑄−𝑖  = 0 
And the best response is: 
(4.5)   𝑄𝑖𝐵𝑅(𝑄1, … ,𝑄𝑁) = 30 − 𝑄−𝑖2         𝑖𝑓 𝑄−𝑖 < 60 
All of the companies are identical, so they have the same response function 4.5, which 
means they have the same output-the best response output. That means that the strategy 
profile {Q1*, …, QN*} is the Nash equilibrium, where each company’s output is equal to 
the best response output-𝑄𝑖𝐵𝑅(𝑄1, … ,𝑄𝑁) or Q*. So the following must be true for the 
equilibrium output Qi-1* : 
𝑄𝑖−1
∗ = (𝑁 − 1) ∗ 𝑄∗ 
If we substitute this into the equation 4.5 we obtain: 
𝑄∗ = 30 − (𝑁 − 1) ∗ 𝑄∗2  
After simplification, the equilibrium output of one company in perfect competitive 
industry is: 
𝑄∗ = 601 + 𝑁 
The output of N firms (the whole industry) is: 60 ∗ 𝑁1 + 𝑁  
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For N->∞ the output of the industry equals 60 000 ounces of gold with a profit of 0.  
 
The problem of this model is that in real world the companies usually do not compete 
by setting the quantities that they produce and they set their own prices.  
4.1.2 Stackelberg model 
This model (or game) was introduced by Heinrich Freiherr von Stackelberg, a German 
economist, in 1934. It models a duopoly in which there is a company that is a leader and 
another one that is a follower. The game is sequential; the leader moves first and sets 
the quantity he is going to produce. Then the follower observes this and sets his 
quantity. Other important assumptions are: 
• Both players are perfectly informed about the game structure and payoffs  
• The leader knows that the follower will follow him 
We will demonstrate the usage of this model on the following example: 
There is a monopolist, Metalheads T’s (MT), producing T-shirts for a certain niche 
market. Each month he has to decide how many T-shirts he wants to order from the 
manufacturer in China. A new company, Brutal T-shirts (BT), wants to enter this 
market. They can observe how many T-shirts the incumbent company is going to 
produce and after that they have to decide how many T-shirts they will produce. The 
monopolist knows that this competitor will make its decision based on their decision 
and they have to set their quantity while keeping that in mind. For the sake of simplicity 
the cost structure is the same for both companies. The costs associated with making one 
T-shirt are 1€. The demand for these T-shirts for the specific market is given by this 
demand curve equation: 
(4.6)     𝑃 = 801 − 2 ∗ 𝑄 
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Figure 4.6 Demand curve for the T-shirts market 
 
4.1.2.1 Monopoly  
The following solution is for the case that the monopolist is alone on this market. How 
many T-shirts will he produce? He will produce the amount of T-shirts that gives him 
the highest profit. His profit function is: 
𝜋(𝑃,𝑄) = (𝑃 − 1) ∗ 𝑄 
After substituting in the demand curve equation 4.6: 
𝜋(𝑄) = (801 − 2 ∗ 𝑄 − 1) ∗ 𝑄 
After simplification: 
𝜋(𝑄) = 800 ∗ 𝑄 − 2 ∗ 𝑄2 
To find the maximum we have to take the derivative with respect to Q and put it equal 
to 0: 
𝜕𝜋(𝑄)
𝜕𝑄
= 800 − 4 ∗ 𝑄 = 0 
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𝑄∗ = 200 
The optimum production for the monopolist is 200 T-shirts, which earns him a profit of: 
𝜋(200) = 800 ∗ 200 − 2 ∗ 2002 = 80 000€ 
So if the monopolist was on the market alone, he would produce 200 T-shirts, sell each 
for the price of 400€ and make a profit of 80 000€. 
4.1.2.2 Duopoly 
Now, the monopolist has to consider that after he makes his decision, he is going to be 
followed by the competitor. The resulting game is a sequential (dynamic) game in 
which the leader moves first and the follower moves second. The production of MT is 
QMT and the BT is QBT, Q= QMT+ QBT. The demand equation now changes to: 
𝑃 = 801 − 2 ∗ (𝑄𝑀𝑇 + 𝑄𝐵𝑇) 
The profit equation of the monopolist now depends on both QMT and QBT. The profit 
equation looks like this: 
𝜋𝑀𝑇 = (801 − 2 ∗ (𝑄𝑀𝑇 + 𝑄𝐵𝑇) − 1) ∗ 𝑄𝑀𝑇 
After simplification: 
(4.7)   𝜋𝑀𝑇 = 800 ∗ 𝑄𝑀𝑇 − 2 ∗ 𝑄𝑀𝑇2 − 2 ∗ 𝑄𝑀𝑇 ∗ 𝑄𝐵𝑇 
The profit equation of BT is: 
𝜋𝐵𝑇 = 800 ∗ 𝑄𝐵𝑇 − 2 ∗ 𝑄𝐵𝑇2 − 2 ∗ 𝑄𝑀𝑇 ∗ 𝑄𝐵𝑇 
To solve this game we have to reason backwards. First we have to find out how will BT 
react to MT’s output choice. To find the output which maximizes profit of BT we have 
to take the partial derivative of their profit function with respect to QBT and put it equal 
to 0. The QMT is considered a constant at this point – the monopolist has already set the 
quantity.  
 
𝜕𝜋𝐵𝑇(𝑄𝑀𝑇 ,𝑄𝐵𝑇)
𝜕𝑄𝐵𝑇
= 800 − 4 ∗ 𝑄𝐵𝑇 − 2 ∗ 𝑄𝑀𝑇 = 0 
(4.8)     𝑄𝐵𝑇𝐵𝑅 = 200 − 𝑄𝑀𝑇2  
The equation 4.8 gives us the answer to the question: How many T-shirts is BT going to 
make given that MT makes QMT T-shirts? It is their best response function. We assume 
the perfect knowledge of the game, so the leader - MT knows this function. His profit 
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depends on the choice of BT’s output so we can substitute the BT’s response function 
into MT’s profit function 4.7.  
𝜋𝑀𝑇 = 800 ∗ 𝑄𝑀𝑇 − 2 ∗ 𝑄𝑀𝑇2 − 2 ∗ 𝑄𝑀𝑇 ∗ (200 − 𝑄𝑀𝑇2 ) 
After simplification: 
(4.9)    𝜋𝑀𝑇 = 400 ∗ 𝑄𝑀𝑇 − 𝑄𝑀𝑇2  
To find the level of output which gives MT the maximum profit, we just have to find 
the maximum of the 4.9 function. 
𝜕𝜋𝑀𝑇(𝑄𝑀𝑇)
𝜕𝑄𝑀𝑇
= 400 − 2 ∗ 𝑄𝑀𝑇 = 0 
𝑄𝑀𝑇 = 200 
MT produces 2000 T-shirts and makes a profit of: 
𝜋𝑀𝑇 = 400 ∗ 200 − 2002 = 40 000€ 
The price for one T-shirt in this situation is 200€. 
When we compare the profit of the monopolist when he is alone and when he has a 
competitor, we see that his profit was reduced to half. 
BT will make: 
  
𝑄𝐵𝑇 = 200 − 2002 = 100 
T-shirts and make a profit equal to half of MT’s profit (half of the number of T-shirts 
times the same price), which is 20 000€. None of the players can do any better by 
changing their output -> it is a Nash equilibrium.  
This model shows that the entry of a new competitor reduces prices and also profits for 
the incumbent firm.  
This model also has another important aspect - the company that moves first always 
makes twice the money of the company that moves last. The first company has the first 
mover advantage. This is not generally true for every game, but it is a property of a 
portion of them.  
4.1.3 Bertrand model 
This model (or game) was introduced by Joseph Louis François Bertrand, a French 
mathematician. The difference between Bertrand and Stackelberg or Cournot model is 
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that the companies in Bertrand model compete with prices instead of quantities. The 
Bertrand game is a static game with perfect information. The companies make their 
decisions independently and simultaneously. Other assumptions: 
• Product is homogeneous.  
• Customers are rational – they buy for the lowest price 
 
To illustrate the usage of this model, consider the following example: 
There are two chemical factories in city that form a duopoly on the market with sulfuric 
acid - Acidity (A) and Bang (B). We assume that both of them produce sulfuric acid 
with constant marginal costs of 5€ per liter of acid and do not have any fixed costs. 
Companies make their prices known independently and at the same time. The product is 
exactly the same from both companies, so the customer only cares about the pricing. If 
the prices are the same, the companies split the market. There is a positive demand for 
the sulfuric acid at a price of 5€ per liter.  
There is no point in selling under the marginal costs of producing the acid so we do not 
have to consider prices below the 5€/lt level. If company A sets its prices at for example 
6€/lt than it is reasonable for the management of B to set the price slightly lower than 
6€/lt, capture the whole market and make profit. If they choose a price higher than A, 
then they will have zero market share and make zero profit. If they choose the same 
price as A, then they will only capture half of the market and make lower profit then 
they would have made if they had chosen a lower price than A. But management of A 
has to consider the same. This concludes that both companies will charge the price of 
6€/lt, which is equal to their marginal costs and is the Nash equilibrium as neither of the 
companies can do any better.  
To allow the companies to make profit in the Bertrand model we have to change our 
assumptions about the game. One of the possible modifications is to limit the capacities 
of the competitors.   
4.1.4 Contestable markets  
This is the newest of the presented models (or games) introduced by William Jack 
Baumol, American economist, in 1982. A contestable market is a market where only a 
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small number of firms operate, but they cannot make excessive profits as they are under 
the threat of entry by potential competitors.  
“A contestable market is one for which: 
1. An unlimited number of potential firms exist that can produce the 
(homogeneous) with a common technology. 
2. Entry in to the market does not involve a sunk cost, that is, an expenditure that 
cannot be completely recovered should the firm decide to leave the market. 
3. Firms are price-setting Bertrand competitors. 
A contestable monopoly is a contestable market with a Nash equilibrium in which 
exactly one firm supplies the entire market. In a contestable monopoly, since the 
threat of entry drive monopoly rents to zero, the firm will produce the greatest 
output at which it remains financially viable. This is referred to as a second-best 
output.”  
(BIERMAN and FERNANDEZ, 1998, p.52-53) 
An example for this kind of market can be a market with taxi services in a small town. 
Consider two taxi companies: AB Taxi (AB) and Okey Taxi (OK). To provide the 
service, the companies only need to have a number of cars and drivers (we will assume 
that there is no need for a special license). There are fixed costs associated with buying 
or leasing the cars needed, but they are not sunk costs as the cars can be sold or used in 
another city. QAB, PAB, QOK and POK are the respective quantities of transported 
passengers and prices for one ride for both companies. The number of clients is in 
hundreds per month and prices are in € per ride. The companies have the same costs, 
which are: 
𝐶 = �4 + 4 ∗ 𝑄      𝑖𝑓 𝑄 > 00                      𝑖𝑓 𝑄 = 0 
If one of the companies decides to quit the market, they can sell their cars and that way 
avoid any losses (no sunk costs). Both companies announce their prices at the same 
time. The demand curve is given by the equation: 
𝑃 = 15 − 2.5 ∗ 𝑄 
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Figure 4.7 Demand and average costs curves for the contestable monopoly 
 
From the picture we can see that at the price of 5€ per ride there is a demand of a 400 
customers. Now, we will show that there are two Nash equilibrium strategies in this 
game for both companies (the companies are the same and so the strategies are 
symmetrical):  
• AB sets its price to 5€ and transports 400 passengers and OK transports no one. 
• OK sets its price to 5€ and transports 400 passengers and AB transports no one. 
It is enough to show that the first strategy is a Nash equilibrium and that neither of the 
players can do any better than playing that strategy. If OK sets its prices lower than 5€ 
they will catch the whole market but they will lose money on it, unless they refuse to 
transport anyone, as the average costs are equal to 5€. If OK sets its prices to 5€ exactly, 
they will transport half of the passengers and also lose money, unless they refuse to 
transport anyone. If they set their prices higher than 5€, they will not transport anyone 
as all the passengers will go to the competition. They will not make any profit, but if 
they sell its cars to another company (or use them in a different city) they will also not 
lose any money. So it is the optimal strategy for OK to not transport anyone and sell its 
cars. It is also optimal for AB to set its prices to 5€, as the lower price would make them 
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lose money on transporting and higher price would make room for a competitor to enter 
the market and make positive profits.  
The important property of this model is that the possibility of entry (not the actual 
entry) is in some special markets enough to keep the prices low enough to discourage 
potential competitors from entering the market.     
4.1.5 Summary of the oligopoly models 
Both Stackelberg and Cournot models model companies competing by setting the 
quantities they want to produce, while Bertrand model models them competing on price. 
Each model has its uses depending on the structure of the market whose behavior we try 
to predict. All of these models in the form given here are too simple to model real life 
markets. The important assumptions to consider are the one-time nature of the price 
setting and also the homogeneity of the companies’ products in these games which is in 
most cases not true in real markets.  
 
4.2 Economic views comparison 
In this chapter different ways of reasoning will presented on an example of a strategic 
investment. 
There are two companies on a pharmaceutical market – Friendly Pharm (FP) and 
Medicinal Goodness (MG). Both of them produce an analgesic medicine. These two 
products are perfect substitutes. Quantities are in kilograms, revenues, costs and profit 
are in thousands of euro and prices are in €/kg. These companies both have the same 
marginal costs, MC1=MC2=MC equal to:  
𝑀𝐶 = 25 
It means that it costs them 25€ to produce one kilogram. The demand curve for these 
products is: 
(4.10)     𝑃 = 109 − 1
6
∗ 𝑄 
Q is the sum of quantities that the companies produce: 
𝑄 = 𝑄𝐹𝑃 + 𝑄𝑀𝐺  
They produce the same quantity of these products, QFP=QMG=168, which is the Cournot 
equilibrium output. At this output the price of one kilogram is: 
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𝑃 = 109 − 56 = 53€ 
They both make a yearly profit of: 
𝜋 = (53 − 25) ∗ 168 = 4704 
It means that the profit of each company equals 4 704 000€.  
FP is considering an investment in a new manufacturing process in their factory. This 
investment would lower their marginal costs to: 
𝑀𝐶𝐹𝑃 = 20 
The cost of this new process is 1 000 000€. 
Now we will compare three different perspectives on this investment: 
• “Accountant’s” perspective 
• “Economist’s” perspective 
• “Game theorist’s” perspective 
4.2.1 Accountant’s point of view 
From this perspective we will count the money that this process will save us and 
compare it with the cost of the machine.  
We produce 168 kilograms with costs 5€ lower than before, so we save: 168 ∗ 5 = 840 
The savings are 840 000€ in variable costs, but the cost of the new process is  
1 000 000€. We can see that the costs of the new process are much higher than the 
savings it brings. So, in conclusion, we advise not to invest in this process as it will 
bring no advantage. 
4.2.2 Economist’s point of view 
From this perspective we can see that when production costs are lowered by the new 
process, we not only save money, but we can also produce more. Our residual demand 
curve is: 
(4.11)   𝑃𝑅 = 109 − 16 ∗ (𝑄𝐹𝑃 + 168) = 81 − 16 ∗ 𝑄𝐹𝑃 
Quantity which maximizes profit is in the point where marginal revenue equals 
marginal costs: 
(4.12)     𝑀𝑅𝐹𝑃 = 𝑀𝐶𝐹𝑃 
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We already know the marginal costs. We can calculate total revenue, denoted by TR, by 
multiplying 4.11 with the produced quantity QFP: 
(4.13)  𝑇𝑅𝐹𝑃 = 𝑃𝑅 ∗ 𝑄𝐹𝑃 = �81 − 16 ∗ 𝑄𝐹𝑃� ∗ 𝑄𝐹𝑃 = 81 ∗ 𝑄𝐹𝑃 − 16 ∗ 𝑄𝐹𝑃2  
From 4.13 we can calculate the marginal revenue by taking its derivative: 
𝑀𝑅𝐹𝑃 = 𝜕𝑇𝑅𝐹𝑃(𝑄𝐹𝑃)𝜕𝑄𝐹𝑃 = 81 − 13 ∗ 𝑄𝐹𝑃 
Now we substitute it into 4.12: 81 − 13 ∗ 𝑄1 = 20 
And we obtain QFP: 
𝑄𝐹𝑃 = 183 
We can also solve it graphically: 
 
Figure 4.8 Graphical solution – „economist‘s“ 
With the output of 183 kilograms the new price is: 
𝑃 = 109 − 16 (183 + 168) = 50.5€ 
And the profit is: 
𝜋𝐹𝑃 = (50.5 − 20) ∗ 183 = 5581.5 
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The new profit is 5 581 500€. The difference between the profit before adopting the 
process and after adopting is 877 500€ which is still lower than the costs of the new 
process. So, in conclusion, we again advise not to invest in this process as it will bring 
no advantage. 
4.2.3 Game theorist’s point of view 
The previous view did not take into consideration the opponent’s reaction to our 
increased production. We will model the situation as a sequential game. First the FP 
decides whether to invest or not, then they play Cournot game. To solve this game we 
can use backwards induction. To find the payoffs, we have to calculate the Cournot 
Nash equilibrium of this game. To find it, we have to find the best response function for 
both companies. The best response functions for this example are: 
𝑄𝐹𝑃
𝐵𝑅(𝑄𝐹𝑃,𝑄𝑀𝐺) = 534 − 𝑄𝑀𝐺2  
𝑄𝑀𝐺
𝐵𝑅 (𝑄𝐹𝑃,𝑄𝑀𝐺) = 504 − 𝑄𝐹𝑃2  
When we solve this system of equations, we will get the following equilibrium 
quantities: 
𝑄𝐹𝑃 = 188 
𝑄𝑀𝐺 = 158 
We can also solve it graphically: 
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Figure 4.9 Graphical solution – „game theorist‘s“ 
 
The price is now: 
𝑃 = 109 − 16 ∗ (188 + 158) = 51.333€ 
Now with the output of 188 kilograms the profit is: 
𝜋𝐹𝑃 = (51.333 − 20) ∗ 188 = 5890.604 
Now we see that the payoff from not investing in this new process is 4 704 000€ and the 
payoff from investing is 5 890 604€ - 1 000 000€ = 4 890 604€. The optimal decision is 
to invest in this new process. So, in conclusion, we advise to invest in this process as it 
will bring increased profit. 
 
4.3 Role of uncertainty in decision making 
In this chapter the necessary tools needed to treat games involving uncertainty will be 
recalled. First a concept of mixed strategies, strategies where each move is assigned a 
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probability, will be introduced. Later we will describe games with imperfect and 
incomplete information and tools needed to solve them.  
4.3.1 Mixed strategies 
Each strategy has to assign an action for each decision – which path to take. But this 
does not have to be defined absolutely. The action to be taken can be defined using 
probabilities – each action will be played with a certain probability. Let us explain the 
issue on the following game. 
Two players named Alice (A) and Bob (B) are playing a game of rock-paper-scissors. 
The loser has to pay one euro to the winner. Bob brags to Alice that he is such a good 
player of this game, that if they tie with a rock, it will count as a win for her, and he will 
pay her one euro. The payoffs for this game are: 
Rock (q1) Paper (q2) Scissors (q3)
Rock (p1) (1, -1) (-1, 1) (1, -1)
Paper (p2) (1, -1) (0, 0) (-1, 1)
Scissors (p3) (-1, 1) (1, -1) (0, 0)
Expected payoff to Bob -p1-p2+p3 p1-p3 -p1+p2
Alice
Bob
 
Table 4.1 Payoffs for the modified rock-paper-scissors 
4.3.1.1 Solution with pure strategies 
The pure strategies for this game are: 
• Always play rock – Rock strategy 
• Always play paper – Paper strategy 
• Always play scissors – Scissors strategy 
We can try finding pure strategy equilibrium for this game: 
• If A plays Rock strategy, the best response from B is to play Paper. Given that B 
plays Paper, the best response from A is to play Scissors. {Rock, Paper} is not 
an equilibrium strategy profile. 
• If A plays Paper strategy, the best response from B is to play Scissors. Given 
that B plays Scissors, the best response from A is to play Rock. {Paper, 
Scissors} is also not an equilibrium strategy profile. 
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This way we can check all of the possible strategy profiles and we will find out that 
there is no equilibrium for this game using only pure strategies. 
4.3.1.2 Solution with mixed strategies 
Now the players will choose each action with a certain probability – they will play 
mixed strategies. If the mixed strategies contain all of the player’s pure strategies, they 
are completely mixed strategies. To find the optimal probabilities with which the 
player should play each action we have to calculate the expected payoffs first. Expected 
payoff of a strategy is the sum of the probability of each action multiplied by its payoff. 
The probabilities for player A playing rock, paper or scissors will be denoted p1, p2 and 
p3 respectively and for player B q1, q2 and q3 respectively. It is important that 
p1+p2+p3=1, and q1+q2+q3=1. The equations for the expected payoffs are in the 
following table: 
Rock (q1) Paper (q2) Scissors (q3) Expected payoff to Alice
Rock (p1) (1, -1) (-1, 1) (1, -1) q1-q2+q3
Paper (p2) (1, -1) (0, 0) (-1, 1) q1-q3
Scissors (p3) (-1, 1) (1, -1) (0, 0) q1-q2+q3
Expected payoff to Bob -p1-p2+p3 p1-p3 -p1+p2
Alice
Bob
Payoffs: (Alice, Bob)
 
Table 4.2 Expected payoffs for the modified rock-paper-scissors 
 
After solving the system of equations we will get the following solution: 
p1=1/3, p2=4/9, p3=2/9, q1=1/3, q2=2/9, q3=4/9. It means that player A will play rock 
with probability of 1/3, paper with probability of 4/9 and scissors with probability of 2/9 
and respectively for player B. 
This is the Nash equilibrium with mixed strategies. It means that if both players play the 
actions with those probabilities, they are both equally likely to win.  
An important fact about games and mixed strategies is given by: 
“Every game with a finite number of players, each of whom has a finite number of pure 
strategies, possesses at least one Nash equilibrium, possibly in mixed strategies.” 
(BIERMAN and FERNANDEZ, 1998, p.220) 
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4.3.2 Games with imperfect information 
To describe the games with imperfect information we employ the following example: 
We have a monopolist market for smart phones. There is an incumbent firm - Pear 
Mobile (PM) and a firm that wants to enter this market - Small Mobile (SM). Both 
companies have perfect information about the game structure and payoffs. The game 
consists of two stages. In first stage the entrant decides whether to enter the market or 
not. If the entrant enters the market the game goes into second stage. In the second stage 
PM decides whether to fight the entrant and invest in a huge TV advertisement 
campaign or not fight. There are costs associated with entering the market. It is a 
dynamic game with perfect information. Payoffs are in millions of euro. The game tree 
is depicted in Figure 6.1.  
 
Figure 4.10 Game tree for the entry deterrence game with perfect information 
 
4.3.2.1 Solution with perfect information 
We can find the solution for this game using the backwards induction. Given that SM 
will choose to enter, the best response for PM is to not fight them and get a payoff of 
70. As both players have complete knowledge of the game, SM observes this and 
chooses to enter the market and gets payoff of 20. So the strategy profile {enter, do not 
fight} is the subgame perfect equilibrium for this game. If the incumbent firm says that 
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they are going to fight if the entrant enters, they are making an incredible threat, as it 
is not in their best interest to actually fight SM when they enter. 
4.3.2.2 Solution with imperfect information 
Now we will modify this example by stating that if SM enters and PM fights, there is a 
20% chance that the ad campaign will be a great success. That means it will lure more 
customers and PM will make more money when fighting than when not fighting. It will 
be modeled by introducing the player Nature into the game which decides the outcome 
of the campaign if SM enters and PM decides to fight. Neither player knows the 
outcome of the campaign. This is a game with imperfect information. The game tree 
now looks like this (terminal nodes are labeled to make the next step clearer): 
 
Figure 4.11 Game tree for the entry deterrence game with incomplete information 
 
To solve this game with probabilities we need to modify the backwards induction 
algorithm to work with Nature’s moves. 
4.3.2.3 Modified backwards induction 
We need to modify the first three steps of the backwards induction algorithm like this: 
„ 
1. Start at the terminal nodes of the game and trace each one to its immediate 
predecessor, which will be a decision node for some player. These decision 
nodes are either “trivial”, “basic”, or “complex”. A decision node is basic if 
each of its branches you can either reach exactly one terminal node or a basic 
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decision node belonging to Nature. A basic node with only one branch is trivial. 
A decision node is complex if, starting from one of its branches, you can reach 
one or more decision nodes of strategic players or a complex deicison node 
belonging to Nature. If you reach a trivial decision node, then keep moving up 
the tree until you reach either a complex or nontrivial basic decision node or 
until you can go no further. 
2.  
a. If the basic node belongs to Nature, then when this node is reached, the 
outcome is determined at random using predetermined probabilities. 
Calculate the expected payoff for each player using these probabilities.  
b. If the basic node belongs to a strategic player, then find the optimal 
move by comparing the payoffs the player obtains at each terminal node 
reached from this decision node. Note that every path between a basic 
decision node A and a terminal node B starts at a unique branch of A. 
The branch that leads to the highest payoff for the player is the optimal 
move to make at that node. 
3.  
a. Erase all the branches of the basic decision nodes belonging to Nature 
that you examined in step 2a. Each of these decision nodes now becomes 
a terminal node. Assign to these terminal nodes the expected payoffs you 
calculated in step 2a. 
b. Erase all the non-optimal branches that originate from each of the basic 
decision nodes you examined in step 2b. Each of these basic decision 
nodes becomes trivial. “ 
(BIERMAN and FERNANDEZ, 1998, p.212-213) 
 
Now we apply this modified backwards induction algorithm to the entry deterrence 
game with incomplete information. When we come to the Nature’s move, we calculate 
the expected payoff from terminal nodes T4 and T3. The expected payoff for PM is 0.8 * 
60 + 0.2 * 120 = 48 + 24= 72 and for SM it is 0.2 * (-10) + 0.8 * (-10) = -10.  After 
removing the branches belonging to Nature, the tree now looks like this: 
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Figure 4.12 Pruned game tree for the entry deterrence game with incomplete 
information 
Now we can see that PM’s best move is to fight with a payoff of 72 compared to 70 
when not fighting. After eliminating the corresponding branch, the tree now looks like 
this: 
 
Figure 4.13 Game tree for the entry deterrence game with incomplete information 
after more pruning 
 
From this game tree we can see that SM’s optimal move is not to enter the market and 
get a payoff of 0, compared to -10 when entering. We have found the subgame perfect 
equilibrium and it is {fight, do not enter}. 
4.3.3 Games with incomplete information 
In this subchapter we will analyze and solve static and dynamic games with incomplete 
information.  
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4.3.3.1 Static games with incomplete information – static Bayesian games 
Static game with incomplete information is called a Bayesian game. The normal form of 
the Bayesian game differs from the normal form of a game with complete information. 
It also involves player types and prior beliefs. The player type is information which 
each player knows about him, but not about other players and it determines his payoff 
function. In the case of previous example we can say that player PM can be of two 
types, one with successful campaign and the other one with a not successful campaign. 
Player’s prior beliefs about other players’ types represent the probabilities for each 
possible type of other players.  
(GIBBONS, 1992) 
 
We will modify the previous entry deterrence game again. This time PM has done 
extensive market research and knows for sure, what impact the campaign is going to 
have. One possible outcome is that the campaign will be a great success and PM will 
earn high profit. Another is that the campaign will be a failure and will let the 
competitor enter the market and make a profit. In this game PM moves simultaneously 
with SM and decides whether to invest in the campaign or not. At the same time SM 
independently decides whether to enter the market or not. SM did their research too, but 
they only know that with 60% probability the campaign will be a great success and with 
40% probability a failure. It is a static game with incomplete information, also called a 
static Bayesian game. SM does not know if they are playing a game where the PM’s 
campaign will be a great success or a game where PM’s campaign will be a failure. PM 
knows this. The payoffs of these different games are given in Table 6.3. 
Enter Don't enter Enter Don't enter
Do campaign (100, -10) (120, 0) (60, -10) (80, 0)
Don't do campaign (70, 20) (90, 0) (70, 20) (90, 0)
Payoffs: (PM, SM)
SM
PM
Great success Failure
SM
 
Table 4.3 Payoffs for the static game with incomplete information 
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We can identify that in both of these games PM has a dominant strategy. In the game, 
where the campaign is a great success PM’s dominant strategy is to Do campaign. In the 
game where the campaign is a failure Don’t do campaign is PM’s dominant strategy. 
SM does not have a dominant strategy. To solve this game we have to use the Harsanyi 
transformation. 
 
Harsanyi transformation 
The Harsanyi transformation, formulated by John Harsanyi in 1967 transforms a 
game with incomplete information into a game with complete but imperfect 
information. This transformation is done in this way: first the Nature decides the types 
of each player based on the probability of each type. Then Nature reveals to each player 
his own type. After that both players make their decisions simultaneously and receive 
their payoffs based on their types.  
(GIBBONS, 1992) 
To find the optimal solution for the game after the Harsanyi transformation we have to 
find the Bayesian Nash equilibrium. 
 
Bayesian Nash equilibrium 
In Bayesian games players try to maximize their conditional expected utilities. The 
conditional expected utilities are calculated for every strategy profile from the expected 
utilities which depend on types of players, multiplied by conditional probability 
calculated from prior beliefs about the players’ types.  
(BIERMAN and FERNANDEZ, 1998) 
How to do the calculations is beyond the scope of this work. See the above mentioned 
literature for example. 
“Concepts of dominant strategy (both strict and weak), dominant strategy equilibrium, 
iterated dominant strategy equilibrium, and Nash equilibrium all extend naturally to this 
new class of games if we replace the word “payoff” with “conditional expected 
utility”.” 
(BIERMAN and FERNANDEZ, 1998, p.278) 
The extension of Nash equilibrium to Bayesian games is called the Bayesian Nash 
equilibrium. 
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The entry deterrence game can now be represented by the following table using the 
conditional expected utilities: 
Enter Don't enter
(Do campaign, Do campaign) ((100, 60), (-10)) ((120, 80), (0))
(Do campaign, Don't do campaign) ((100, 70), (2)) ((120, 90), (0))
(Don't do campaign, Do campaign ) ((70, 60), (8)) ((90, 80), (0))
(Don't do campaign, Don't do campaign) ((70, 70), (20)) ((90, 90), (0))
SM
Conditional Expected Utilities: ((successful PM, not successful), (SM))
PM
 
Table 4.4 Conditional expected utilities for the static game with incomplete 
information 
 
Now we can find the strategy profile that is the Bayesian Nash equilibrium. If we 
evaluate all of the strategy profiles we can find that the strategy profile {(Do campaign, 
Don't do campaign), (Enter)} is the only Bayesian Nash equilibrium for this game. 
4.3.3.2 Dynamic games with incomplete information 
Again the entry deterrence game will be slightly modified. This time PM knows 
whether the campaign will be a great success or a failure and has to make the decision 
to do it or not. But the campaign is also more expensive. PM is of two types: Successful 
and Unsuccessful. SM has done some market research and has prior beliefs that with the 
probability of 25% the campaign will be a great success and with the probability of 75% 
it will be a failure. Players move in sequence, first PM has to decide whether to do the 
campaign or not. After that SM, observing PM’s decision but not knowing their type, 
has to make a decision whether to enter the market or not.  It is a dynamic game with 
incomplete information. We will use the Harsanyi transformation and model this game 
as a game with imperfect information where Nature moves first and decides the type of 
PM. The game tree with payoffs is depicted in Figure 6.5. 
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Figure 4.14 Game tree for the dynamic game with incomplete information 
 
The dashed rectangles around SM’s decision nodes represent two different information 
sets. At the time SM is making their decision to enter the market or not, they do not 
know the type of PM, they only know their previous decision to do the campaign or not. 
PM has two decision two make: whether to do the campaign when they know it will be 
successful and whether to do the campaign when they know it will be a failure. SM has 
two decisions to make: whether to enter the market when PM does the campaign and 
whether to enter the market when PM does not do the campaign. Now we have to 
calculate the conditional expected payoffs and find the Nash equilibria of this game. 
The normal form representation of the game: 
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(Enter,          
Enter)
(Enter, Don't 
Enter)
(Do campaign, Do campaign) ((70, 30), (-10)) ((70, 50), (-2.5))
(Do campaign, Don't do campaign) ((70, 70), (12.5)) ((70, 90), (-2.5))
(Don't do campaign, Do campaign ) ((70, 30), (-2.5)) ((70, 50), (5))
(Don't do campaign, Don't do campaign) ((70, 70), (20)) ((70, 90), (5))
(Don't Enter, 
Enter)
(Don't Enter, 
Don't Enter)
(Do campaign, Do campaign) ((90, 30), (-7.5)) ((90, 50), (0))
(Do campaign, Don't do campaign) ((90, 70), (15)) ((90, 90), (0))
(Don't do campaign, Do campaign ) ((90, 30), (-7.5)) ((90, 50), (0))
(Don't do campaign, Don't do campaign) ((90, 70), (15)) ((90, 90), (0))
SM
PM
Conditional Expected Payoffs: ((successful PM, not successful), (SM))  
Table 4.5 Normal form of the dynamic game with incomplete information 
 
This game has two Nash equilibria: {(Don’t do campaign, Don’t do campaign), (Enter, 
Enter))}, {(Do campaign, Don’t do campaign), (Don’t enter, Enter))}. To find the one 
which does not involve incredible threats, we have to find the subgame perfect 
equilibrium. But in this game, the whole game is one subgame, so both strategy profiles 
are subgame perfect equilibria. We have to find the perfect Bayesian equilibrium.  
 
Bayesian updating 
Important notion is that SM does not know PM’s type, but has some belief about it. SM 
assigns probabilities for each of the information sets (possible PM types) and this is 
called the belief profile. There are two nontrivial information sets in the previous 
example - Do campaign and Don’t do campaign. Belief profile for these two 
information sets can be: {Do campaign: (successful: 0.50, unsuccessful: 0.50), Don’t do 
campaign: ((successful: 0.50, unsuccessful: 0.50),)}. It means that SM believes that if 
PM does the campaign that they will be with 50% probability successful in campaign 
and with 50% unsuccessful (these beliefs are just for example). These probabilities have 
to be updated after SM observes PM’s decision to reflect this decision. To update them 
we will use Bayesian updating. Bayesian updating uses the Bayes theorem to 
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calculate posterior probabilities (in the example it’s the SM’s belief about PM’s type 
after observing PM’s decision). 
(BIERMAN and FERNANDEZ, 1998) 
The calculations are beyond the scope of this work. See the above mentioned literature 
for example. 
 
Perfect Bayesian equilibrium 
“A perfect Bayesian equilibrium consists of a strategy profile and a belief profile such 
that: 
1. The collection of strategies constitutes a Nash equilibrium, given the players’ 
beliefs.  
2. At each player’s information set, the move required by the player’s strategy 
maximizes that player’s expected utility, given the player’s beliefs about the 
state of the worlds at that information set and the other players’ strategies. 
3. Wherever possible, every player’s beliefs can be derived from the equilibrium 
strategy profile and the common prior beliefs using Bayesian updating. 
(BIERMAN and FERNANDEZ, 1998, p.328-329) 
 
For the previous example the only perfect Bayesian equilibrium is the strategy profile 
{(Do campaign, Don’t do campaign), (Don’t enter, Enter))} and the belief profile {Do 
campaign: (successful: 1, unsuccessful: 0), Don’t do campaign: ((successful: 0, 
unsuccessful: 1),)}. There is no belief profile for the other strategy profile to be a 
perfect Bayesian equilibrium. It involves incredible threat that SM will enter the market 
no matter what PM does, but it is not in their best interest to enter the market if PM does 
the campaign.  
4.4 Auctions 
Auctions are a quite common way of selling various types of things, where the potential 
buyers announce their prices and the seller (or the person that leads the auction) sells the 
item to the highest bidder. The buyers generally have different opinion about the value 
of the item being sold. Nowadays internet auction websites are a prospering trend. Also 
some of the governments use auctions to sell rights and properties and to raise funds. 
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We can distinguish these types of auction: 
• Sealed bid auction – the bidders send their bids privately, bidders are not aware 
of how much other bidders bid. This type of bidding is commonly used for job 
contracts, where each potential contractor sends his bid in a closed envelope. 
The best bid wins the contract. The sealed bid auctions can have two variants: 
 First price auction – the winner of the auction pays the amount of money 
he bids 
 Second price auction – also called the Vickrey auction. The winner does 
not pay his own bid, but pays the second highest bid 
• Open outcry auction – bidders openly announce their bids, for example they 
shout an amount of money they are willing to pay. The common variants are: 
 Ascending auction – also called English auction. It is a type of auction 
where the bidders make higher and higher bids and the last bidder-with 
the highest bid wins the auction  
 Descending auction – also called Dutch auction. In this type of auction 
the price starts at a certain level and descends with passing time. The 
price descends until someone makes a bid or it reaches the limit price set 
by the seller. The first bidder wins the auction and pays the current price. 
This type of auction was typically used to sell tulips in Netherlands. 
 
• Common value auction – the real value of the item being sold is the same for all 
of the potential buyers, for example the drilling right in a certain location have 
the same value-the amount of gas there is in this location. But this value is not 
100% known to everyone before the auction ends. Otherwise it would make no 
sense to sell it this way. Buyers have different assessments of the real value of 
the item being sold based on their beliefs, experience or previous research.  
• Private value auction – the real value of the item being sold is different for each 
buyer. The buyer knows his evaluation of the object being sold but does not 
know the evaluations of other buyers. For example the value of the painting is 
different for people with different artistic tastes or family ties to the author of the 
painting.  
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• Single-unit auction – in this auction there is only one item being sold. For 
example a sale of one house. 
• Multi-unit auction – in this auction there is more than one identical item being 
sold, and the buyers not only announce their bid, but also the quantity they want 
to buy. 
 
In the following subchapters we will explain the terms needed and compare the 
monetary gain for the seller with different types of auctions. 
4.4.1 Winner’s curse 
Consider the following example: 
You want to buy a used boat in an Internet auction. It is an open outcry ascending 
(English) common value auction. All of the potential buyers make public bids and the 
highest bid wins the auction. The real value of the boat being sold is the same for each 
buyer - it is 10 000€, but their predictions of this value differ. The seller is only going to 
sell the boat if the offer is higher than 9000€, which is his reserve price. The value of 
the boat is different for the seller and for the buyers. We can for example say that there 
are 5 other potential buyers and they value the boat at 9 800€, 9 900€, 10 000€,  
10 100€, and 10 200€ respectively.  
If all of these buyers bid their true evaluations for the boat, the fifth bidder would win 
the auction with the bid of 10 200€ and lose 200€ on it, as the boat is only worth 10 
000€. That is called the winner’s curse. Winner’s curse is very common in real world 
common value auctions. In private value auctions each buyer knows the real value of 
the object to him, so the winner’s curse is not a problem. 
4.4.2 Auction as a game 
If the bidders don’t always bid their true evaluations, we call it bid shading. The 
auction, where buyers (players) are rational and play strategically (they shade their 
bids), can be thought of as a game and analyzed using the tools of game theory. 
4.4.3 Comparison of auction types with perfect information 
Consider the following example: 
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There is an auction selling a flat. There are only two buyers - Andrew (A) and Bill (B). 
Player A’s evaluation of the flat is vA = 58 000€ and player B’s evaluation is vB = 42 
000€. The price of the flat will be denoted as P. The price and also the payoffs will be in 
thousands of euro. The payoff for player A if he wins the auction is equal to vA-P. The 
payoff for player B if he wins the auction is vB-P. The payoff for the losing player is 0. 
The bids of individual players will be denoted bA and bB respectively.  
4.4.3.1 First price sealed bid auction 
The players announce their bids simultaneously and independently. Winner is the player 
who made the highest bid and he pays his bid. If both players bid the same, the winner 
is decided by a toss of a coin, giving each player a 50% chance of winning. This auction 
is a static game with perfect information. The bids can only be made in multiples of  
10 000€. The strategic form of the game is described by Table 7.1. 
10 20 30 40 50
10 (16, 24) (0, 38) (0, 28) (0, 18) (0, 8)
20 (22, 0) (11, 19) (0, 28) (0, 18) (0, 8)
30 (12, 0) (12, 0) (6, 14) (0, 18) (0, 8)
40 (2, 0) (2, 0) (5, 0) (1, 9) (0, 8)
Bill
Expected payoffs: (Bill, Andrew)
Andrew
 
Table 4.6 Strategic form of the first price sealed bid auction 
Since Andrew knows that his evaluation of the flat is higher than Bill’s evaluation he is 
going to bid only as low as possible higher amount of money than Bill. Because the bids 
have to be multiples of 10 000€, he will bid 50 000€ and win the auction. This solution 
is the only iterated weakly dominant equilibrium. If the bids can be made in multiples of 
one euro, Andrew would bid only one euro higher than Bill’s evaluation of the flat  
(42 001€) and win the auction. If the increments between bids approach zero, winner is 
Andrew, because he values the flat the most, and he pays 42 000€ - Bill’s evaluation of 
the flat.  
4.4.3.2 Second price sealed bid auction 
The players announce their bids simultaneously and independently. Winner is the player 
who made the highest bid and he pays what the loser bid. If both players bid the same, 
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the winner is decided by a toss of a coin, giving each player a 50% chance of winning. 
The game may be described by Table 7.2. 
10 20 30 40 50
10 (16, 24) (0, 48) (0, 48) (0, 48) (0, 48)
20 (32, 0) (11, 19) (0, 38) (0, 38) (0, 38)
30 (32, 0) (22, 0) (6, 14) (0, 28) (0, 28)
40 (32, 0) (22, 0) (12, 0) (1, 9) (0, 18)
Andrew
Bill
Expected payoffs: (Bill, Andrew)  
Table 4.7  Strategic form of the second price sealed bid auction 
 
There is more than one equilibrium solution for this game. Important equilibrium is the 
one where both players bid their true evaluations bA=50 and bB=40. It shows that it is 
rational to bid the true evaluation in second price auctions. Again, in this auction if the 
increments between bids approach zero, winner is Andrew, because he values the flat 
the most, and he pays 42 000€ - Bill’s evaluation of the flat. 
4.4.3.3 Open outcry ascending (English) auction 
In this auction both players alternately raise the price of the flat until the price is equal 
to Bill’s evaluation. At this point Andrew only raises the price once more and wins the 
auction. If the increments approach zero he will pay Bill’s evaluation of the flat. Again 
the player that valued the flat the most won the auction and paid the loser’s evaluation. 
4.4.3.4 Open outcry descending (Dutch) auction 
In this auction, the price begins at for example 90 000€. Then this price gets lowered 
each time by 10 000€ until one of the players accepts the price. When one of the players 
accepts the announced price, he wins the auction, pays the price and the auction ends. If 
both players accept the price at the same time, the winner is decided by the flip of a coin 
(Nature). When the price drops to 0€, the auction ends without selling the flat.  
This game is sketched in Figure 7.1. 
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Figure 4.15 Part of the game tree for the open outcry descending auction 
 
The dashed rectangle around Bills decision nodes means that they are in the same 
information set - it models that at the time that Bill is making his decision to pass or 
accept he does not know Andrew’s decision.  
In this auction Bill’s strategy is to pass until the price drops to 40 000€. Andrew knows 
this, so his strategy is to pass until the price drops to 50 000€ and accept that price. 
Andrew will win the auction and pay 50 000€. If the decrements approach zero, Andrew 
will win because he values the flat the most and he will pay Bill’s evaluation.  
4.4.3.5 Summary 
For all four types of auctions the result is the same. The player with the highest 
evaluation of the item being sold wins the auction and he pays the evaluation of the 
loser. The revenue for the seller is the same too. 
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4.4.4 Comparison of auction types with imperfect information 
Consider the following example: 
There is a small art auction, selling a few works of a recently deceased local artist. 
There are two buyers interested in one of the paintings being sold. One of them - Mr. 
Stein (S) is a family member of the artist that painted the particular painting. For him 
the value of the painting is VS and his bid will be denoted bS. The second buyer is an art 
collector Mr. Hoarder (H) and the painting has VH value for him and his bid will be 
denoted bH. Both players believe that the other one values the painting between 0€ and 
100€ with uniform distribution. The players’ valuations are independent of each other 
and not known to other players. It is an independent private value auction. 
4.4.4.1 First price sealed bid auction 
Players simultaneously make their bid which means this is a static Bayesian game. The 
winner is the player with the highest bid and he pays his bid. The actual calculations of 
the Bayesian Nash equilibrium are beyond the scope of this work. The solution is that 
both players will bid half of their evaluation. Expected revenue of the seller is: 
𝑅 = 𝐸 �12 max{𝑉𝑆,𝑉𝐻}� = 12� � max{𝑉𝑆,𝑉𝐻}𝑑10001000 𝑉𝑆𝑑𝑉𝐻 = 1003  
(BIERMAN and FERNANDEZ, 1998, p.299) 
So the expected revenue is 333.33€. The highest bidder wins the auction and pays his 
bid. 
4.4.4.2 Second price sealed bid auction 
In this auction the winner pays the loser’s bid. In equilibrium in this auction both 
players bid their true evaluations. It is a dominant strategy for both players. The revenue 
for the seller is: 
𝑅 = 𝐸(min{𝑉𝑆,𝑉𝐻}) = 12� � min{𝑉𝑆,𝑉𝐻}𝑑10001000 𝑉𝑆𝑑𝑉𝐻 = 1003  
(BIERMAN and FERNANDEZ, 1998, p.301) 
So the expected revenue is 333.33€. The highest bidder wins the auction and pays his 
opponent’s bid. 
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4.4.4.3 The revenue equivalence theorem 
“In an independent private values environment with risk-neutral bidders, the expected 
price paid for the object is the same under the first-price and second-price sealed bid 
auctions.”  
(BIERMAN and FERNANDEZ, 1998, p.301) 
This theorem states that it does not matter which type of auction we use, the seller 
makes the same amount of money. In practice, the results are different because of 
various other factors. 
4.4.4.4 Open outcry ascending (English) auction 
“The Dutch auction is strategically equivalent to the first price, sealed bid auction, 
whatever the auction environment.” 
(BIERMAN and FERNANDEZ, 1998, p.302) 
This theorem states that the open outcry ascending auction will yield the same 
equilibrium outcome as the first price, sealed bid auction, as the players’ strategies are 
the same. 
4.4.4.5 Open outcry descending (Dutch) auction 
If the bidder’s valuations are not correlated and are initially known, the following is true 
for the open outcry descending auctions: 
“In an independent private values environment, the English auction is strategically 
equivalent to the second price, sealed bid (“Vickrey”) auction.” 
(BIERMAN and FERNANDEZ, 1998, p.302) 
This theorem states that the open outcry descending auction will yield the same 
equilibrium outcome as the second price, sealed bid auction, as the players’ strategies 
are the same. 
4.4.4.6 Summary 
In all types of auctions mentioned before the revenue to the seller is the same. The 
player with the highest bid for the item being sold wins the auction. 
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4.5 Computer science and game theory 
In this chapter a few examples of applications of game theory which are related to 
computer science and information technology will be presented. It is the subject of 
study of Algorithmic and Computational game theory. 
Algorithmic game theory is a science field which analyzes and designs algorithms in 
strategic environment using game theoretic tools. Closely related to it is the 
computational game theory which uses computer systems to solve and design game 
theoretic models and also uses game theory to model computer systems and network. 
Game theory is also applied in the field of multi-agent systems and other fields. 
4.5.1 Languages, libraries and simulation tools 
There are libraries of game theoretic tools and software for programming languages 
including C, C++, Java. Some example implementations: 
• Gambit – a library of game theoretic tools written in C++ 
• Trade Network Game – a framework for simulating trade networks written in 
C++ 
Game theoretic models can be simulated using a variety of simulation tools including: 
• Java applets on the internet for simple simulations 
• Matlab toolboxes 
There are many specialized pieces of software that predict the behavior in economy, 
politics and other fields using simulations of the game theoretic models. 
4.5.2 Routing 
Game theory can be used to analyze the problem of routing in computer networks. For 
example we can take the following network: 
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Figure 4.16 Diagram of a network illustrating the Braess's paradox 
 
The (unregulated) network is given as four connected nodes with given rate of traffic of 
200 packets sent from A to D. The goal is to assign traffic to paths in a way which 
minimizes total latency in the network. The latency at each path is given in the graph (x 
is number of packets sent through the node). At each node, the path with the lowest 
latency is selected – the players are rational (selfish). The Nash equilibrium solution 
always has the same latency for each chosen path from start node (A) to end node (D). 
If we for the moment ignore the path from B to C which has latency 0, the Nash 
equilibrium solution for this game is that 200/2=100 packets will go through the node B 
and 100 packets will be routed through C and the total latency in the network will be  
𝐿 = 200210 + 15 = 25 
This is also the optimal solution.  
When we consider the path between nodes B and C which has latency 0, the whole 
traffic will be routed on the A->B->C->D path and the latency will be: 
𝐿 = 20010 + 0 + 20010 = 40 
There is a significant increase in total latency when we add the B->C path. This is an 
example of the Braess’s paradox. It is a Nash equilibrium solution but not an optimal 
one. The optimal solution would be the same as before, that is to route half of the traffic 
through A->B->D and half through A->C->D.  
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(AXELROD and WERNER, 2004) 
4.5.3 Online advertisements and auctions 
Auctions are widely used on the internet to sell various products and online 
advertisement. The best known examples are probably Google and eBay.  
Google is a web search engine which generates most of the revenue with sponsored text 
advertisements. In Google they use a second price auction to determine the price for the 
sponsored search results. The advertisers compete for advertising slots in the search 
results by posting the maximum price they are willing to pay for a click or thousand 
impressions. The auctions are completely automatic and take place every time a user 
searches for keywords in which the advertisers are interested. Winners are ranked 
considering a number of factors including the price the advertiser is willing to pay (his 
bid) and the quality of the advertisements - auction. The winning advertisements are 
presented to the user. If the user clicks on the advertisement, the advertiser is charged 
according to the next highest ranking advertisement. 
(GOOGLE, 2012), (VARIAN, 2008) 
eBay is an online auction website and it uses second price auctions to sell various 
products. The sellers post items for sale and they are able to specify their reservation 
price and limit the length of the auction. The buyers post their bids for the items they 
want to buy and the highest bidder wins the auction. The winner then pays the next 
highest bid. 
4.5.4 Peer-to-peer systems 
Peer-to-peer systems are most known for the file-sharing service like Napster or 
BitTorrent. In peer to peer systems users usually assume two roles: a client that wants to 
download a file (use a service) or a server that uploads this file (provides the service). In 
order to achieve stability in an environment with many users it is necessary to design 
the system in a way to encourage cooperation between users and discourage “free-
riding” – downloading and not uploading. This is also applicable to problems of inter-
domain routing, community wireless networks and many others. Game theory is applied 
to design such mechanisms. The players are rational and try to maximize their payoffs. 
Their strategy is how much they are willing to contribute. The game played here is a 
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repeated game with many players. The goal is to find equilibrium solution where users 
cooperate.  
One possible solution is to use reputation and service differentiation based systems. In 
these systems users that contribute to the system are given better service than the users 
that do not contribute to the system. Their reputation is based on the overall contribution 
(ratio between upload and download). This creates incentives for the users to contribute 
to the system (upload more than download). 
Another solution is used by the BitTorrent, which uses multiple interactions between the 
same users when downloading one file. They achieve this by splitting the files into 
many small parts, which the peers share between themselves.  
Other solutions are based on using currency which is gained by contributing. 
(NISAN (ed.), et al., 2007) 
4.5.5 Other applications 
Game theory has also been applied to problems in: 
• Cryptography and information security 
• Load balancing 
• Network design 
• Resource allocation 
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5 Conclusion 
This work provides a survey of the most commonly used game theoretic models and 
their economic applications. It involves a review of basic game theoretic tools, 
modeling oligopolies, the role of information in decision making, auctions and a few 
computer science related applications. 
Game theory is a mathematical discipline claiming high professional mathematical 
background, which is not easy to grasp for nonmathematicians seeking this discipline 
for applications. It was imperative to understand the theoretic principles to formulate the 
models used in this work. 
Almost all of the sources used for this work are in English as there is a shortage of 
bibliography in Czech/Slovak language.  
My own contribution was mainly getting familiar with the tools of game theory and 
creating and solving the models for the presented economic examples.  
Game theoretic tools are being used not only in economics but also in biology, political 
science, philosophy, computer science and others. Recently, game theory is being 
applied on a broader scale. There are many other important applications related to 
economics not included in this work. Most notably: repeated and cooperative games, 
voting, effects of moral hazard and the field of evolutionary game theory.  
Game theory and its applications still promise a lot more in the future. 
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